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The purpose of this MBA Project was to identify and explore logistical 
frameworks that leverage technology to overcome problems associated with coordinated 
logistics operations during crisis management. Over the past ten years, there have been 
significant advances in RFID, satellite and other related asset visibility technologies. 
These advances are mature enough to significantly increase the probability of achieving a 
useful common operational picture during emergency response activities. Recent crisis 
response operations that would have benefited from improved asset visibility include the 
Indian Ocean tsunami, the Pakistani earthquake, Hurricane Katrina and those related to 
the Global War on Terror. In each of these cases, multi-agency involvement, both foreign 
and domestic, compounded the complexity of asset tracking and communication 
protocols. The establishment of a logistics-tracking framework that provides adequate 
asset visibility, while maintaining operational security, will greatly increase the 
effectiveness of future crisis response operations. The proposed logistics framework 
serves as a viable solution for common logistical problems encountered by the U.S. and 
other industrialized nations while conducting crisis response operations. The framework 
identifies concepts, technologies and protocols that can be used to improve crisis 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
As evidenced by recent large-scale disasters, there are significant shortfalls with 
regard to the emergency response capabilities of the United States and the international 
community. In the U.S., the response to Hurricane Katrina uncovered several systemic 
problems associated with coordinated logistics. These problems hindered the ability of 
response professionals to create an atmosphere of trust and confidence among those 
affected. Logistical failure was recognized as a major contributing factor to the overall 
response breakdown, particularly the absence of reliable, secure and appropriately 
transparent asset visibility. By asset visibility we mean the capability of crisis response 
personnel to access timely and accurate information regarding the location, status, 
identity, and requirements associated with available resources (The White House, 2006, p 
44). 
Coordinated logistics is a pivotal component in the conduct of effective crisis 
management. The goal of coordinated logistics should be to maximize efficiency with 
respect to the allocation of available resources. In order to achieve this, the right people 
within each agency or organization need to be communicating and monitoring the same 
situational picture. Done well, multi-agency coordination can provide a tremendous 
positive impact. Done poorly, it may yield severe negative results. This research identifies 
and explores relevant technologies and their potential roles within existing and developing 
frameworks designed to facilitate coordinated response to large-scale crises. In recent 
years, there have been significant advances in RFID, satellite and other related asset 
visibility technologies. Of particular value are technological advances that increase the 
probability of achieving a useful common operational picture during emergency response 
activities. 
The overall effect of multi-agency involvement has served as a primary trigger for 
our research. The level of simultaneous interaction required from various diverse entities 
compounds the complexity of asset tracking and related communication protocols. As a 
mitigating factor, it is imperative to maintain an appropriate focus on the concept of “open 
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architecture” because it encourages and facilitates modularity, economies of scale and 
decreased learning curves, all factors that contribute to lower costs. Doing so will have a 
profound effect on the costs associated with emerging and developing technologies. The 
establishment of a logistical framework built on the concepts of open architecture, reliable 
asset visibility, and operational security, will greatly increase the effectiveness of future 
crisis response operations and provide the assurance that is necessary for the success of 
any crisis response system.  
Given the state of technology in today’s world, there is no reason why 
governments should not be able to provide better crisis response. Wildfires, earthquakes, 
tornados, hurricanes, tsunamis, and terrorist attacks are all realities throughout the world. 
Some question the United States’ ability to respond effectively. Others believe that 
America has strong logistical capabilities with respect to crisis management. Despite the 
shortfalls of the Katrina disaster response, the tools and resources to achieve the desired 
state of readiness already exist and could be exploited. Whether or not the right decisions 
will be made, depends on the leadership at the highest and most critical levels. The U.S. 
has implemented innovative logistics solutions in the past. The Liberty Ships and the 
Pacific Campaign of WWII, the Berlin Airlift, and the Desert Storm pre-invasion build-up 
are a few examples. But, as we all have probably experienced, you are only as good as 
your last failure. It is now time to set forth on the next large-scale innovative logistical 
solution. The logistical frameworks and associated technologies that are explored can 
provide the groundwork and background for improved crisis response programs in the 




II. LOGISTICS DURING CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
A. ASSET VISIBILITY AND THE COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE 
Relief efforts in response to recent large-scale disasters such as the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami (December 2004), Hurricane Katrina (August 2005) and the Pakistani 
Earthquake (October 2005) have confirmed the need for more effective logistics 
operations during crisis response.  
A study conducted by the Fritz Institute, a San-Francisco based non-profit 
organization that works with humanitarian relief organizations and the private sector to 
identify solutions to complex operational challenges, concluded that the Tsunami relief 
effort was marred with logistical problems. Some 100 officials in charge of logistics 
operations were surveyed at 18 of the largest humanitarian organizations that participated 
in relief operations. Sixteen of these organizations reported that at the time of the disaster, 
they suffered from shortages of experienced logisticians within the South Asian region. 
Only 5 of the organizations claimed to have access to integrated computer software that 
allowed for the tracking of resources. Many of the groups did the best they could with 
what they had, tracking resources manually or through the use of generic spreadsheet 
programs. The survey also found that, while many of the organizations made an effort to 
coordinate with local authorities and the military, only about half reported efforts to 
coordinate with other relief agencies. This lack of coordination is believed to have 
contributed to many of the logistical bottlenecks that hindered relief operations (Jensen, 
2005). 
Considerable advances in communication, satellite and RFID technologies offer 
viable solutions to several traditional logistical problems. Reliable in-transit visibility, 
coupled with improved interagency communication and coordination, has the potential to 
provide significant benefits to all stakeholders. The need for these benefits is especially 
apparent during the critical life-saving hours following a disaster. The proper application 
of in-transit visibility can greatly increase the probability that a useful common 
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operational picture will be achieved during crisis response operations. Without it, the 
chances of providing assurance during chaos will be significantly diminished. 
A common operational picture allows identical, relevant information to be shared 
by more than one command, agency or authority. It facilitates collaborative planning and 
coordinated operations by providing all echelons the ability to achieve a high level of 
situational awareness (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2003, p GL6). Relevant information could be 
as broad as a nation’s entire stock of small pox vaccination and as detailed as the last 
known location of a pallet of Meals-Ready-to-Eat (MREs). While conducting crisis 
management activities, critical time sensitive information could be the difference between 
chaos and order. Within the Logistics function of an Incident Command Center, asset 
visibility is the key component that contributes to a useful common operational picture. 
The figure below illustrates how systems and agencies linked by an integrated 
communications network can use and share information about resources, thereby allowing 
accurate, real-time asset visibility, a key requirement in the effective flow of material 
logistics. 
 
Figure 1.   Conceptual Integrated Framework (adapted from DSCC, 2005; NIMS 2004; 
NRP, 2004)  
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B. LOGISTICS OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF HURRICANE KATRINA 
To identify the most promising courses of action for the implementation of an 
integrated crisis response logistics model, we must glean insight from the most advanced 
existing frameworks. Equally important is recognizing the most recent and comprehensive 
example of crisis response where these frameworks were fully tested.   
Several serious concerns were publicized during the Hurricane Katrina disaster 
that led to the perception of an ineffective federal response system.  The sheer magnitude 
of the storm was such that certain effects of its power were impossible to effectively 
mitigate (The White House, 2006, p 34). However, tools that could have mitigated many 
negative effects of the storm and its aftermath were not exploited (Newman, 2006). 
Although there were few deaths from long-term exposure or starvation, and there was a 
minimal international response, Hurricane Katrina is a useful case study. This particular 
disaster tested and pushed many response functions to and, in many cases, past their 
breaking points. State-of-the-art response assets and protocols were employed on a large 
scale, and there were unprecedented levels of media coverage and data to analyze 
(Reuters, AlertNet. 2005). 
Logistical tracking is one of the only major shortcomings that former FEMA 
director Mike Brown pinpointed during the September 27th 2005 congressional hearings 
held to “Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina” (Library of 
Congress Congressional Record, 2005). Logistical tracking becomes increasingly 
important as the size and scope of the subject disaster increases.  If a disaster only covers a 
square mile, most logistics can likely be disbursed from one central and secure location. 
As the disaster area increases, there is a greater requirement for more complex logistical 
tracking and planning.  Because assistance from FEMA and other federal agencies is more 
commonly required during large scale emergencies, logistics tracking is a central concern 
in FEMA’s coordination role.  If assets cannot be tracked, coordination by FEMA or 
anyone else is effectively unattainable. 
In addition to the Congressional Hearings, there was tremendous pressure to 
provide further answers as to why Katrina relief efforts were inadequate. In response, the 
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Whitehouse published The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned in 
February of 2006. Numerous logistics-related issues cited in the Lessons Learned 
document demand an increased effort to transform the way in which coordinated logistics 
is conducted. The following excerpts emphasize the need for significant Department of 
Defense (DoD) involvement, improved logistics tracking systems and overall asset 
visibility.  
1. Logistics-Related Recommendations Following Hurricane Katrina 
The DoD has the most sustained experience in conducting contingency operations. 
Its inherent culture of discipline and regulations is well-suited for immediate response 
activities.  
 The DoD and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should 
plan and prepare for a significant DoD supporting role during a 
catastrophic event. The DoD’s joint operational response doctrine is an 
integral part of the national effort and must be fully integrated into the 
national response at all levels of government. DoD should have a 
contingency role and a requirement to assist DHS with expertise in 
logistics, planning, and total asset visibility (The White House, 2006, p 
94). 
The National Guard has an accepted and tried role in crisis response. They have 
ties within their own state and neighboring states that provide them with insights less 
likely achieved by standard national U.S. military forces.  Many capability limitations 
inherent within the National Guard can be met through the use of designated federal 
military personnel and resources. In order to realize these capabilities, a structure must be 
created to optimize cooperation and coordination.    
  DoD should consider fully resourcing the Joint Task Force State 
Headquarters to address capabilities gaps and to enhance readiness. 
Enhance National Guard capabilities by resourcing and fully 
implementing Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) State. JFHQ-State 
transformation is key to rapid deployment of National Guard forces in 
response to a catastrophe (The White House, 2006, p 95). 
Asset visibility can be achieved using common standards throughout the integrated 
supply chain. As part of a useful common operational picture, asset visibility positively 
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contributes to decision-making processes by allowing the most efficient allocation and 
distribution of life-saving resources.  
  The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with State 
and local governments and the private sector, should develop a modern, 
flexible and transparent logistics system (The White House, 2006, p 98).  
Many commercial products were offered to FEMA during the Hurricane Katrina 
response.  The difficulties of entering these items into the federal supply chain left many 
of them unutilized.  Compatible asset visibility systems increase the likelihood that items 
donated by or purchased from commercial business entities concurrent to the crisis 
response will be effectively managed.  
 DHS should partner with State and local governments, other 
Federal agencies and the private sector to develop an efficient, transparent 
and flexible logistics system for the procurement and delivery of goods and 
services during emergencies. “The new logistics system developed in 
concert with State and local governments, and the private sector should be 
transparent to all managers within the system (Federal, State and local 
governments and the private sector). The system should be comprehensive 
so that the full range of logistical requirements and the flow of goods and 
services can be tracked from provider to receiver (The White House, 2006, 
p 98). 
In any operation, there is value in clearly defining hierarchical and cooperative 
relationships among all stakeholders. For crisis response activities, this becomes even 
more important because time spent deciding who should make decisions is critical time 
wasted.   
DHS should establish a Chief Logistics Officer to oversee all 
logistics operations across multiple support functions. The Chief Logistics 
Officer (CLO) would be responsible for developing and maintaining an 
integrated supply chain management system. This system should be 
structured in ways that are compatible with the structure of the National 
Incident Management System. The CLO would be responsible for logistics 
technology and software solutions that allow emergency managers to have 
visibility of all assets in the supply chain and to be able to access those 
supplies. A CLO should also be established in each homeland security 
regional office (The White House, 2006, p 99). 
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 Drawing on the DoD’s experience in developing logistics systems for the DHS 
will reduce friction and miscommunication among all crisis response agencies. 
Cooperation between the two agencies before a disaster will provide critical benefits 
toward cooperation during a disaster. Personnel exchange programs are an effective way 
to achieve this working relationship in a sustaining manner. 
DoD should detail logistics planners to DHS to assist in developing 
this logistics system. DoD and DHS should review and consider supply 
chain management best practices in developing the DHS logistics system. 
DoD should assist DHS in developing its logistics system; train DHS 
personnel in logistics management; exercise the DHS logistics system; and 
assist operating DHS’ logistics management system until a fully mature 
capability exists (The White House, 2006, p 99). 
The sovereignty of State governments in managing crises within their own State is 
a critical concept in any process transformation that incorporates changes in the Federal 
scope of action or authority. Incentives may be needed to pressure States into accepting 
and meeting Federal requirements.       
DHS should require State and local governments, as a condition for 
receiving Homeland Security grants, to develop, implement, and exercise 
emergency evacuation plans and to cooperate fully with all Federal 
evacuation activities. Consideration should be given to revising the 
Stafford Act to restrict reimbursement eligibility to only those States that 
have met basic performance requirements for critical functions such as 
mass evacuation (The White House, 2006, p 100). 
The need for DoD integration in hurricane response is not a post-Katrina concept 
as some of the previous excerpts imply.  The need for transformational integration of DoD 
assets was recognized prior to Katrina. The excerpt below shows the concerted yet 
underdeveloped attempt to coordinate FEMA and the DoD.  Within this limited 
cooperative framework, the DoD was still able to provide useful asset visibility support to 
FEMA during the Hurricane Katrina response.      
Well before Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) prepared for the 2005 hurricane season. 
Based on prior assistance for hurricane recovery operations, on August 
19th the Secretary of Defense approved a standing order to prepare and 
organize for severe weather disaster operations. This order expedited the 
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pre-positioning of senior military representatives known as Defense 
Coordinating Officers, to act as liaisons with other governmental 
organizations in the projected disaster area prior to an event. The order 
also authorized the use of DOD installations as logistical staging areas for 
FEMA. U.S. Northern Command directed a number of emergency 
deployment readiness exercises prior to FEMA requests, spending training 
funds to preposition response capability. Once officially activated and 
deployed, DOD provided logistics support to FEMA, helping the Agency to 
track items in motion (The White House, 2006, p 130). 
The Federal Government has explored, and become more knowledgeable about, 
existing deficiencies and corresponding solutions. Logistics, command structure, 
discipline and heavy DoD involvement are major themes of the Katrina Lessons Learned 
document. While this government document provides a realistic assessment of the 
situation during the Hurricane Katrina relief effort, other sources are needed to provide a 
complete picture.  
2.  Redundancy and Communications 
During an emergency, responders often do not have the luxury of time to recover 
from a system or device failure.  If an asset tracking device or system fails, the emergency 
situation will likely be over before repairs or remediation can be put into place. 
Additionally, if time is spent on recovering the tracking system, the lost time may hinder 
operations to the extent that it would be better to do without the tracking system 
altogether. When a system fails, it is often better to move forward using any redundant 
tracking system available, even if it does not provide the accuracy, timeliness or clarity of 
the primary system (Nutting, Interview, 2005). 
One way to achieve redundancy in asset tracking is through the duplication of 
functionally identical tracking devices or systems. An example of this would be the 
placing of four passive RFID tags per pallet of a tracked asset. This arrangement will 
allow each of the pallets’ vertical sides to have a tag, thus affording quicker reading 
without searching for a tag.  This also allows item identification if one or more of the tags 
is damaged or obscured. Another way that redundancy can be achieved is to utilize distinct 
and dissimilar tracking devices and systems.  For example, the use of passive RFID tags 
on a pallet could be bolstered by a satellite transponder on the trailer that contains the 
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pallet. Additionally, the truck that is moving the trailer may use CB radio or a cell phone 
to provide regular location updates. This practice of using redundant means of 
communication can be very important during various emergencies where communication 
system failures are common.  
During natural disasters, as in traditional military operations, conditions exist that 
can easily disable required power supplies and communication equipment. If backup 
systems are concurrently operating or can be quickly brought on line, the mission can 
continue with limited adverse interruption. One way to minimize the necessity for 
redundancy is through the strengthening of existing or future logistics tracking systems. A 
good example of this is the use of mobile satellite communications, which are less 
vulnerable to probable threats.  
3.  Decision Support Systems  
Good decision making requires accurate information processing.  Too much 
disorganized information can create a significant challenge during emergency response 
efforts because excess information can over-saturate those who are trying to make 
decisions. Precise and highly pertinent information promotes effective decision making, 
especially in emergency situations. If decision makers spend too much time evaluating 
exhaustive amounts of unrefined information, they may have insufficient time to 
effectively act on that information.  The use of Automatic Information Systems can help 
collect, refine, and present large amounts of raw data that can be transformed into 
actionable information.  
A properly implemented Automatic Information System is essential to achieving 
an effective common operational picture. An Automatic Information System is composed 
of system software and hardware that provides for collection, storage, retrieval, processing 
and sharing of data and information. If an Automatic Information System is designed and 
implemented properly, it can support most operational scenarios. If not, it can drain time 
and effort without the essential pay back. There must be confidence and buy-in by those 
using the system so they take the time to properly input and use the information. Quality 
outcomes depend on quality inputs.         
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4.  Information Security 
Hurricane Katrina has made it evident that information held by local officials can 
be dangerous and hamper relief efforts.  During the Hurricane Katrina relief effort, there 
were several instances where logistical tracking information in the wrong hands could, and 
sometimes did, have negative affects. In a letter by Terry Maddox, the publisher of Slidell 
Sentry-News, it is described how “Parish President Davis threatened to take all available 
parish law enforcement personnel, as well as members of the general public, to go to 
Baton Rouge to hijack FEMA trailers for our displaced citizens.” (Maddox, 2005).  This 
sort of vigilante behavior is very dangerous and appears to have hampered relief efforts 
(Chenelly, 2005). What might a rogue parish president do if he knew there was a truck 
containing generators and fuel traveling through his parish on its way to a distant 
distribution point?     
On the other hand, information can instill trust and promote cooperation between 
victims and the emergency responders.  If the public and officials know that supplies are 
heading into their area, they can respond in numerous constructive ways.  Victims can 
clear and prepare distribution centers. Uninjured citizens can bring injured victims to areas 
where medical supplies will be arriving. If it is known that required supplies are not going 
to arrive, the local population or leaders can make decisions to conduct an evacuation or 
ration existing supplies. If trust is maintained, disaster victims are more likely to employ 
shopping carts to transport the injured and relief supplies, and they are less likely to use 
those carts for looting. Any time the victims can be made part of the solution, they are less 
likely to exacerbate the problem. Therefore, serious attention needs to be given to public 
distribution of information as well as distribution of information to federal, state, and local 
agencies. To determine how best to address these concerns, we first consider the logistics 

























III. CURRENT CRISIS RESPONSE LOGISTICS MODELS 
The design of effective logistics tracking systems is highly dependent on the 
hierarchical and communication structures utilized by the relevant crisis response 
agencies. The United States and the United Nations both have significant disaster response 
entities that require complex levels of logistical protocols.  Each has realized the need to 
restructure their logistics entities to benefit from a more coordinated and functional 
response. Therefore, it is important to analyze how asset visibility technologies work 
within organizational structures in order to achieve the best results. In some aspects, the 
U.S. and the UN have developed and implemented technology to fit their organizational 
structures. In other aspects, they have changed their organizational structures to better 
meet available technologies. We will now look at how each is currently organized with 
respect to logistics operations during crisis response.  
A. U.S. CRISIS RESPONSE MODEL  
The organizational model for the U.S. is based on the concept of handling 
incidents at the lowest possible organizational and jurisdictional level. Depending on the 
nature of the crisis, that level might be the local police department or it might be the U.S. 
Coast Guard. For federal emergency management purposes, the U.S. is broken down into 
10 regions (see Figure 2).   
 
Figure 2.   Federal Emergency Management Regions (USDHS, 2006)  
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Within each of these 10 regions are pre-positioned federal and state assets. During 
a large-scale disaster, various agencies compete for many of the same resources. The 
designated agencies alone provide 15 separate emergency support functions (ESFs) at 
various levels of government (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1.   Agencies Competing for Resources  (The White House, 2006, p 16) 
 
When asset visibility is poor, and the perception of scarce resources is high, 
inefficiency with respect to distribution increases. Support agencies may tend to hoard 
resources in an attempt to ensure their own sustained operations. Without a common 
operational picture, response professionals are unable to maximize efficiency when 
making decisions with respect to resource allocation.  
In February of 2003, President Bush, in an attempt to strengthen U.S. Homeland 
Security, issued a Presidential Directive to the Secretary of Homeland Security. Within the 
order, the Secretary was directed to:  
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a. Create a comprehensive National Incident Management System 
(NIMS) to provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, State, 
and local governments to work effectively together to prepare for, respond 
to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or 
complexity (The White House, 2006, p 12) and 
b. Develop and administer an integrated National Response Plan 
(NRP), using the NIMS, to provide the structure and mechanisms for 
national level policy and operational direction for Federal support to State 
and local incident managers (The White House, 2006, p 12). 
The presidential order further directed all Federal department heads and agencies 
to adopt and use the NIMS as well as assist the Secretary of Homeland Security in its 
development and maintenance (NIMS, 2004). Completed in early 2004, the National 
Incident Management System and the National Response Plan provided a foundation for 
how the Federal Government would organize itself when called to respond to crises 
(NIMS, 2004).  
 
Figure 3.   National Incident Management Systems (NRP, 2004, p 19)   
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An integral and key element of the NIMS is the Incident Command System (ICS). 
Refined and developed over many years, the concept of the ICS can be attributed to the 
challenges associated with interagency coordination while fighting wildfires in the 
western U.S. It had been successfully implemented at the federal, state, and local levels 
for some time prior to being incorporated into the NIMS (NIMS, 2004).  The effectiveness 
of the ICS is a result of its organizational structure that can be customized to manage 
incidents of varying complexity and size. One main goal of the ICS is to clarify reporting 
relationships, thus eliminating confusion caused by manifold, and potentially conflicting, 
information and directions (NIMS, 2004). As shown in Figure 4, ICS consists of five 
major functional areas: Command, Planning, Operations, Logistics, and Finance & 
Administration (NIMS, 2004). 
 
Figure 4.   Incident Command Element Hierarchy (NIMS, 2004, p 13)   
 
The NIMS command structure places logistics as one of the core sections within its 
Incident Command System (ICS). The Logistics Section of the ICS is designed to be 
flexible in design and function to more effectively and efficiently meet each specific 
incident’s requirements.  The ICS command structure calls for an Incident Command 
Section Chief to determine the initial organizational structure of his or her particular 
section. The organizational structure is then designed to allow transformation to meet the 
requirements of the particular incident. ICS’s organizational structure is modular by 
nature, allowing for variations in the size, type, complexity, and scope of an incident 
(NIMS, 2004). 
The implementation of modularity within an organizational framework is based on 
several considerations. First, the form of the organization must be developed to coincide 
with its function or task. Second, only the functional elements needed to meet the 
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requirements of the specific function should be staffed. Third, span-of-control guidelines 
must be observed. This requires a high level of organizational and individual discipline 
and confidence in the plan and those placed in positions of authority. Fourth, functions of 
any non-activated organizational element must be performed at the next highest level. And 
finally, to keep confusion, redundancy, and wasted effort to a minimum, organizational 
elements that are no longer required must be deactivated (NIMS, 2004).   
Although the overall concepts of the NIMS are reasonable and have been 
successfully employed in the past, the unpredictable and increasingly complex nature of 
new situations requires innovative solutions. In addition to the right people, the right 
training, and the right plan, the right technologies also need to be put into action on a 
practical level.  
B. UNITED NATIONS CRISIS RESPONSE MODEL  
The United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
is responsible to “mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in 
partnership with national and international actors in order to: alleviate human suffering in 
disasters and emergencies; advocate for the rights of people in need; promote 
preparedness and prevention; and facilitate sustainable solutions.” (OCHA, 2005, p 5).  
For logistics management, OCHA maintains a Logistics Support Unit (LSU).  The LSU is 
a small unit that has a planned staffing of only three personnel and a 2006 requested 
budget of 443,629 U.S. Dollars (LSU OCHA, 2006). 
OCHA’s LSU receives primary backing from the United Nations Joint Logistics 
Center (UNJLC).  The UNJLC was formed to provide leadership in assembling and 
managing humanitarian resources.  The UNJLC’s formation was motivated by the 1996 
crisis in Eastern Zaire where significant problems with resource distribution and 
cooperation among various agencies became tremendously evident. The UNJLC concept 
has been effectively used in several UN operations including Somalia, Kosovo, East 
Timor and Afghanistan. The UNJLC has become more formalized with a permanent 
standing presence in Rome (UNJLC, 2005). 
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The UNJLC, initiated in March 2002, supports several UN entities including the 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children’s 
Fund UNICEF, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the World Food Program 
(WFP).  The WFP acts as the UNJLC’s custodian, contributing personnel and assets. The 
UNJLC’s core unit is also housed within the WFP’s Operations Department (UNJLC, 
2005).  The core unit provides the base structure to respond to UNJLC operations.  The 
size of a mobilized UNJLC is kept to a minimum to maintain flexibility.  After the 
decision is made to mobilize the UNJLC, support staff requirements are determined.  The 
staffing requirements are then manned to meet the mission’s requirement (UNJLC, 2005). 
Because of its joint nature, the UNJLC provides a standardized controlling body 
for the implementation of technologies across the various UN agencies. The need for a 
centralized logistics coordination center is a common goal of both the United States and 
the United Nations crisis response bodies.  A primary principle to keep in mind is the 
common evidence of growing modularity within their structures. Figure 5 illustrates the 
modularity provided by the UNJLC. While these UN agencies possess their own in-house 
logistics section, they can call upon the UNJLC for technical expertise and material 
support.  
 
Figure 5.   Logistical Modularity in the UN  
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(for more information on organizational structures and relationships, see OCHA, 2006), 
UNHCR, 2004, UNICEF, 2006, UNWFP, 2004, UNWHO, 2006)  
Achieving redundancy, modularity and a common operational picture through 
asset visibility are the primary motivating factors in the implementation of technology in 
support of logistical operations during crisis response. Achieving a common vision across 
various competing and independent agencies is an enormous undertaking. But, powerful 
tools do exist and even more compelling ones are being developed. So the question is not 
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IV. OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT TECHNOLOGIES 
In this section, we look at relevant technologies that are available and in use by the 
private sector and various government agencies. In doing so, technologies that directly 
relate to the enhancement of coordinated logistics operations will be highlighted.  
A. RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION (RFID) 
RFID technology is a means of identifying unique objects through the use of radio 
frequency transmissions. This rapidly growing and proven technology can support asset 
visibility during crisis management by allowing data to be captured quickly, efficiently 
and accurately throughout all stages of the supply chain. Access to reliable information 
regarding the location, quantity, condition and description of resources increases the 
quality of rational decision-making at all levels of command. The group of technologies 
that make up radio frequency identification can be broken down into the three general 
categories of active, semi-passive and passive RFID. The functional components of an 
RFID tag consist of a chip, antenna, and in some cases a power supply (See Figure 6). The 
chip holds descriptive information about the item and the antenna is a means of 
transmitting that information. Table 2 provides an overview of the three types of RFID 
technologies currently in use with common applications and technical specifications 
(GAO, 2005). 
 
Figure 6.   Standard Passive RFID Tag (GAO, 2005) 
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Table 2.   RFID Tags (Meloan, 2003)  
 
1. Passive RFID 
In many ways passive RFID is seen as the successor to today’s bar code 
technology.  However, passive RFID technology has several advantages over bar code 
technology.  First, passive RFID tags do not require line-of-sight to be read. Also, in many 
cases, line-of-sight is not required when writing to them. This allows RFID tags to be 
placed within packaging, thus minimizing the chance of damage or tampering.  Second, 
the read range of most passive RFID tags exceeds that of barcodes.  Third, many RFID 
tags can be read simultaneously.  For example, a pallet loaded with RFID tagged boxes of 
blankets, cartons of diapers, and cases of emergency rations can be carried by forklift 
through an RFID interrogation station and those particular items can be identified and 
inventoried without any additional operator interaction. Fourth, RFID tags have the 
potential to store far more data than standard barcodes. Instead of just identifying a type of 
product, RFID tags can identify a particular item with its very own identification number. 
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With more advanced tags a particular item’s historical data such as location, temperature 
and moisture profile can be stored and later read (Wilkas, 2004). 
There are also challenges associated with passive RFID technology. In some ways, 
the technology is still in the developmental stage. As the technology further develops, 
there is a great need for common standards. The level of success in developing these 
common standards will have a tremendous impact on the value of RFID systems today 
and into the future.  The two main dynamic drivers involved in developing standards 
include the continuous advancements in new RFID technologies and the continuous 
growth in prospective RFID uses throughout the world’s supply chain. The ongoing 
integration of the global economy makes this standardization even more important (GAO, 
2005). 
EPCglobal is a leading non-profit association working to develop effective 
standards for RFID and other supply chain tracking protocols. EPC has an open 
membership founded cooperatively between European Article Numbering International 
(EAN) and the Uniform Code Council (UCC). Its standard model is based on their vision 
of providing “a simple, compact license plate that uniquely identifies (items, cases, pallets, 
locations, etc.) in the supply chain” (EPC Global Inc, 2005) which they have trademarked 
as the Electronic Product CodeTM (EPC). “The EPCglobal Network is a set of technologies 
that enable immediate, automatic identification and sharing of information on items in the 
supply chain.” (EPC Global Inc, 2005).  The EPC itself is comprised of sets of numbers, 
each with a specific purpose (See Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7.   EPC Tag (Meloan, 2003) 
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Another challenge with passive RFID is the initial startup and recurring 
operational cost. Initial costs include readers (interrogators), writers, network systems, 
training and other required material modifications to set up the system. Recurring costs 
include the cost of the actual tags, equipment upkeep and ongoing training (GAO, 2005). 
As the technology has developed, there have been cost reductions due to learning 
curve and economies of scale. If growth in RFID continues, as many expect, the cost per 
tag and the associated return on investment will continue to make the implementation of 
RFID more economically practical (ID Tech Ex, 2005). 
More and more companies, including leaders like Wal-MartTM, have begun 
implementing RFID technology into their logistics system (ID Tech Ex, 2005). The next 
few years will likely determine whether passive RFID will become a wide spread industry 
standard like the Uniform Product Code (UPC), remain more of a niche technology, or 
mature in another direction.      
2. Passive RFID Technology Basics 
Three primary elements make up passive RFID tags. The Chip stores the 
representative data for the item to which the tag is attached. The Antenna receives energy 
and data signals from an interrogator and can then transmit data from the chip back to the 
interrogator. The third necessary component of an RFID tag is its Packaging. The 
packaging is used to secure the tag to an item and hold the chip and tag in the proper 
position (DSCC, 2005).   
A common RFID packaging practice is to attach the chip and antenna on a 
printable integrated barcode providing backward compatibility (See Figure 8). There are 
also a growing number of dual format reader-interrogators that have the ability to read 
both RFID and barcode data. This flexibility is vital to many types of operations and can 
smooth several of the difficulties with any industry in transition from one standard to 
another. Additionally, the redundancy of dual-technology tags can be of great value. For 
example, if a tagged label is covered by exterior packaging, the RFID will likely still 
provide effective identification. If the RFID circuitry is damaged the barcode will most 
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likely still be readable. These types of redundant practices decrease the probability that 
critical processes will be bypassed if certain aspects of the technology fail (Buy RFID, 
2005). 
 
Figure 8.   Hand-held Scanner and Passive RFID Tag (PSC, 2006; Microsoft, 2006) 
 
3. Active RFID 
Active RFID encompasses a wide variety of technologies and levels of complexity. 
Active RFID is generally composed of a battery energized tag that generates a relatively 
strong, constant or intermittent, signal that in many cases reaches 300 feet. Some common 
types of active RFID tags utilize satellite and cellular telephone based transponders. After 
an active tag generates a signal, then a portable or stationary receiver collects the tag data 
and can integrate that data into a designated asset tracking and identification system.  One 
of the main limitations of active, as well as semi-passive, RFID tags is their usual 
dependence on battery power. As battery life and signal handling efficiency have 
improved, the effective operational life of active tags has similarly increased (GAO, 
2005). 
Active tags, in one of their simplest forms, provide serial number type data that 
can be read either while static or in motion. However, active tags can also be integrated 
with various sensors so they can store and transmit large amounts of descriptive data and 
conditional parameters such as temperature, moisture content and impact readings (GAO, 
2005). 
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Active tags are generally more expensive than passive tags and therefore are more 
frequently used with high value items or larger amounts of particular items. For example, 
many rail cars are fitted with active RFID for tracking and inventory purposes. Because of 
greater costs associated with active tags, they are generally configured to be re-used 
(GAO, 2005). 
4. Semi-passive RFID 
Semi-passive RFID generally refers to tags that are read by a passive interrogator 
but also provide additional sensor or specification data. Like active RFID tags, semi-
passive tags require batteries. Common sensor parameters include temperature, moisture 
content and impact readings. Compared with standard passive tags, semi-passive tags 
provide additional benefits at higher costs (Meloan, 2003). 
B. SATELLITES  
As we saw during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, existing communications 
infrastructure is vulnerable to destructive forces. Satellite systems offer redundancy and 
reliability that can circumvent such problems and therefore deserve serious consideration 
within logistical frameworks. Several different global positioning and communication 
satellite systems are currently in use or being implemented.  Their far-reaching capabilities 
transcend existing ground-based communication infrastructure.  
When satellites were first developed, they had little impact on the average person. 
Today, they are instrumental to a wide array of military and private sector operations. In 
addition to delivering television, telephone and radio signals, satellites are used to map the 
globe. This capability allows users to precisely pinpoint any particular location on the 
Earth’s surface, an invaluable tool for navigational purposes and asset tracking. With the 
capability to transfer large amounts of data becoming commonplace, satellites are helping 
to make the idea of a global connectivity possible. Corporations such as Hughes and 
Motorola are putting satellite systems into space that will supply extensive broadband data 
capabilities. If everything works as predicted, users of satellite broadband will be able to 
connect to the internet via satellite from anywhere on earth (Whalen, 2006).  
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The United States’ Global Positioning System (GPS) includes 24 NAVSTAR 
satellites operated by the U.S. Air Force. It is used to track everything from airplanes, 
vehicles, ships, and personal electronic devices to people and animals. Common 
applications include: navigation, construction, farming, mining, logistical supply-chain 
management, package delivery, geological forecasting, emergency services, and biological 
research (Pellerin, 2006). 
GPS tracking can provide real-time asset visibility anywhere with satellite 
coverage.  A GPS-capable device, affixed to a logistical asset, obtains a triangulated fix by 
comparing distances from various GPS satellites in orbit. After a fix is obtained, a 
transponder transfers data via communication satellite to a station that can transmit the 
location information through various communication systems (Land Air Sea, 2005). GPS 
satellite tracking can provide a secure and reliable tracking system for use in conjunction 
with logistical planning in areas that have been subject to various forms of devastation 
(GPS Select, 2005). 
Currently, the United States maintains the only truly global, fully-operational 
system. However, the European Union and countries including Russia, Japan and China 
are developing their own international satellite navigation systems. International 
negotiations ranging from financial partnering to interoperability are issues of great 
interest to all involved (Pellerin, 2006). 
C. RESOURCE DATABASES/APPLICATION SOFTWARE 
Technological advances associated with computer hardware have provided 
organizations the ability to store massive amounts of information relatively cheaply. 
However, problems associated with information overload can outweigh the potential 
benefits of collecting data. Application software provides a means to effectively use large 
amounts of data. Data mining, querying, and the ability to generate ad hoc reports are 
some of the tools available to users (GAO, 2005). 
Private sector companies like WalMart™ have demonstrated the feasibility of 
implementing IT systems that are capable of effectively managing enormous amounts of 
data. When the cashier scans an item at checkout, the information is stored in a database 
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where it is immediately accessible throughout the supply chain. The information, recorded 
one time, is then used for re-stocking, quarterly reports, transportation scheduling, raw 
material purchases, etc. (ID Tech Ex, 2005). Giving the appropriate people access to the 
right information increases their ability to make better decisions. It also provides all 
































V. PROPOSED LOGISTICS FRAMEWORK 
A. INTEGRATED COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK MODEL 
Recalling the conceptual model presented earlier, Figure 9 illustrates how the 
Logistics Function fits within an overall communications framework.  
 
Figure 9.   Communications Model (adapted from DSCC, 2005)   
 
Perhaps the most essential characteristic of the proposed framework is that of open 
architectural design. It can operate in conjunction with various existing 
telecommunications infrastructures or independent of them. By incorporating resource 
databases and powerful application software, it can easily accept various technologies that 
adhere to universal standards and specifications. Further, because current satellite systems 
are capable of operating with various satellite communication devices, several different 
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methods of data transfer can be utilized. This redundant capability affords alternatives that 
create a seamless logistics process within the overall framework. More importantly, the 
framework will facilitate the goal of maintaining a common operational picture among all 
relevant agents and throughout all levels of the supply chain.  
B. INTEGRATED SUPPLY CHAIN MODEL 
The proposed logistics supply chain can be broken down into five separate stages 
or components comprising Manufacturers, Distribution Centers, Carriers, Operational 
Logistics Centers, and the Customer.  The following figure shows how both active and 
passive RFID technology can be integrated throughout the supply chain. 
 
Figure 10.   Integrated Supply Chain (adapted from DSCC, 2005) 
 
Active RFID technology, including satellite tracking, is generally most effective in 
maintaining asset visibility between the Distribution Centers and the Operational Logistics 
Centers. Passive RFID is better suited for tracking assets between the Suppliers and 
Distribution Centers. It is also better for interactions involving Operational Logistics 
Centers and Customers. This can be accomplished by capturing data from passive RFID 
tags to be included within an electronic manifest that will be associated with a specific 
active RFID tag. The current supply chain model that is being employed within existing 
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frameworks is similar to that of an integrated military supply system. However, there are 
some distinct areas where the two vary.  In these areas the disaster response logistics 
system should be better aligned with military protocols as these standards have been 
designed for and employed in many unforgiving environments. Military and disaster 
response logistics operations are being transformed through the development of logistics 
technologies. Applying these technologies appropriately will require flexibility as each 
incident response will vary according to specific circumstances.  
C. TRACKING RESOURCES THROUGH THE SUPPLY CHAIN 
1. Manufacturers/Suppliers 
The first stage of the integrated supply chain involves the Manufacturers who 
originally produce and package the required items. These items may or may not be 
initially or solely produced for crisis response.  For example, a plastic tarp manufacturer in 
Mexico may ship their product to the United States where it could be sold at a Wal-
MartTM or purchased by the government for integration into an emergency response kit. 
The tracking process begins with the identification of a requirement and the subsequent 
creation of a requisition within the web-enabled database. Ideally, the Manufacturer will 
be incorporated into the integrated communications network. This will enable asset 
visibility beginning at the time of initial shipment.   
Preferably, the manufacturer will be responsible for tagging the resource with a 
passive, EPC-compliant RFID tag that may also be encoded with additional value-added 
data. Examples of additional data might include instructions for use or relevant warnings. 
Issues of consideration include tag placement (where on the product the tag should be 
placed), and what level of identification is practical (every pallet, every case, or every 
individual unit). Currently, DoD contracting guidelines require RFID compliance from 
vendors. Specifically, “the “DoD will use and require its suppliers to use EPC Class 0 and 
Class 1 tags, readers and complimentary devices” (USD AT&L, 2004, p 1). Further, 
“Radio Frequency Identification will be a mandatory DoD requirement on solicitations 
issued on or after October 1, 2004 for delivery of material on or after January 1, 2005” 
(USD AT&L, 2004, p 1).  
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The process of incorporating tagged items into the crisis response supply chain can 
be simplified through the utilization of common labeling standards for military, business, 
and crisis response agencies. Since the DoD has focused much of their efforts on the 
adoption of industry best practices and standards, it would be most effective to apply those 
same standards to the procurement of crisis response resources. Aligning procurement 
standards with the DoD will facilitate further compliance among vendors as it will allow 
them to identically label items for practically all government agencies. It will also allow 
military-specific items to be more easily integrated into any crisis response framework. In 
addition to facilitating integration, standardization enables flexibility, accuracy, and lower 
costs (USD AT&L, 2004). 
Given that this is the initial stage of the supply chain, decisions and actions made 
at the manufacturer level can greatly affect the success of the rest of the system. Remedial 
actions, such as retagging, can and sometimes will need to be performed at subsequent 
stages.  However, these later actions increase the cost and the probability of introduced 
errors.  
2. Warehousing and Distribution Centers 
The second stage of the integrated supply chain involves regional Warehousing 
and Distribution Centers. This stage covers a wide range of storage and distribution 
functions and facilities. It includes various commercial distribution centers, long-term 
emergency supply warehouses, and cross-docking operations. This is the stage where the 
commercial market most directly interfaces with the crisis response logistical network. 
RFID technology, utilizing uniform standards, can provide value to crisis response 
agencies and their suppliers. At these locations, cases, pallets, and containers may be 
stored, re-packaged or reconfigured to meet operational or emergency reserve 
requirements.    
Once a resource arrives at a Warehouse/Distribution Center, it must pass through a 
RFID interrogator (static or hand-held) before it can be included as inventory. Maintaining 
strict discipline at an entry and exit control point is a key factor in ensuring inventory 
accuracy. The interrogator records all relevant data which is then automatically transferred 
to the Web-enabled Resource Database via the existing telecommunications infrastructure 
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or via communication satellites. At this point, the increased inventory level associated 
with this particular resource is immediately reflected within the database. Anyone with 
access to the database now has visibility of the resource. When the resource leaves a 
Warehouse/Distribution Center for transport to an Operational Logistics Center, the 
resource is read by a RFID interrogator. All relevant information related to the in-transit 
resource is recorded and immediately uploaded to the Web-enabled Database. The 
decreased inventory level (as well as the fact that the resource is in-transit) is reflected and 
could trigger a decision to replenish supplies at a particular location.  
Consolidated mission packs are one way to achieve additional efficiency and 
flexibility. This involves reading in data from multiple items tagged with barcodes, RFID 
tags, or other labeling, then consolidating those items into one package, case, or pallet, and 
finally re-writing the consolidated information to a single RFID tag. In most cases this 
process will be completed in preparation for possible future crisis requirements.  However, 
with the integration of RFID, consolidating crisis specific mission packs can be conducted 
much more effectively during the crisis response.  
3. Operation-specific Transport  
The third stage in the integrated supply chain involves Operation-specific 
Transport. This component encompasses movement from warehouse and distribution 
centers to the in-theater depots and operational logistics centers.  This transportation piece 
covers a wide range of possible modes and distances. It could represent multi-modal 
intercontinental transport utilizing any combination of ship, rail, truck, and air. It could 
also represent a mule train moving supplies from warehouses located in the cities of 
Kashmir to Operational Logistics Centers serving earthquake victims in the surrounding 
mountain regions.  
Asset visibility in this stage could be achieved by utilizing stationary readers, 
active RFID tags, and existing ground-based communications infrastructure. However, in 
many relevant crisis scenarios, terrestrial data connectivity may be lost. Satellite 
communication is much less susceptible to destructive forces that are often common to 
crisis situations. Satellite technology can bypass infrastructure and communicate directly 
with logistics assets and secure resource database locations. Asset identification and item 
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specific details can be stored and transmitted from the conveyance or the transport 
module. The load manifest can be located locally on the conveyance or held remotely at a 
secure Web-enabled Database site.  
While in transit, the satellite transponder, which is attached to a logistics asset, 
such as a container on a truck, ship, train or plane, periodically receives location data from 
GPS satellites. It then relays that data to the Web-enabled Database via communication 
satellites. The resource can be tracked by association with the satellite transponder. If the 
transponder should fail, the operator of the logistics asset may have the capability of 
communicating with the command center or directly with the Web-enabled Resource 
Database using a satellite-enabled phone or computer.  
The U.S. Army has had great success with its Movement Tracking System (MTS) 
(O’Brien, 2004). The system is being tactically employed in Iraq and Afghanistan. MTS 
uses GPS and communication satellites to track the location of mobile logistics assets. 
Comtech Mobile Datacom (the company who developed the system) also incorporated 
two-way satellite text messaging, a capability useful for re-routing instructions, weather 
conditions, and other real-time situational data. The requirement for MTS grew out of 
lessons learned from the first Gulf War, where the U.S. Army experienced insufficient 
asset visibility with respect to logistics assets and resources (Buxbaum, 2005). 
An important evolutionary step for MTS is the Military’s plan to integrate passive 
and active RFID technologies into the system. The Department of Defense is in the midst 
of a massive program to have suppliers place RFID tags on cases and pallets of goods, 
with the purpose of tracking supplies throughout the supply chain. By incorporating RFID 
data into MTS, a military logistician will be able to immediately know the location of a 
vehicle or container as well as its contents. While nearly all of the National Guard’s 
logistics vehicles operating in Iraq are fitted with MTS, relatively none of its U.S.-based 
vehicles are MTS equipped (Buxbaum, 2005).  
4. Operational Logistics Centers 
The fourth stage of the integrated supply chain is comprised of Operational 
Logistics Centers.  While these centers perform many of the same functions as the 
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warehouses and distribution centers of the second stage, they differ in that they are located 
near or at the disaster site. Here, resources are received from operation-specific carriers 
and subsequently distributed to customers. The Operational Logistics Centers can vary in 
size and composition depending on the customer base and the supplies received for 
distribution.  Due to challenges associated with connectivity and power during a crisis, 
this stage can present great difficulties in implementing RFID tracking. However, it is also 
where the greatest benefits of achieving asset visibility can be realized. 
Upon arrival at the Operational Logistics Center, a resource must be read by a 
RFID interrogator (static or hand-held). All relevant data are then uploaded to, and 
reflected in, the Web-enabled Database via existing terrestrial telecommunications 
infrastructure or via the communication satellites. Anyone with access to the database has 
visibility of the resource. Before being distributed to the end user, resources are read into 
the database where they are reflected as expended items. Figure 11 illustrates an 
Operational Logistics Center layout and one possible RFID interrogation configuration.  
 
 
Figure 11.   Operational Logistics Center (adapted from Randon, 2005) 
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Using this configuration, the data associated with incoming and outgoing resources 
can be captured by various forms of RFID readers to include: vehicle-mounted, fork-lift 
mounted, hand-held and static. Maintaining strict control at the RFID read points will 
ensure the highest level of data integrity, a factor that is essential for useful Automated 
Information Systems and other Decision Support Systems. 
5. Customers      
The customer is the fifth and final stage in the integrated supply chain. Customer is 
a general term to indicate the point at which the supplies leave the control of the 
distribution entity.  A customer can be a single person in a car, a family on foot or a 
church bus obtaining supplies for victims using a church as a refuge center.  
The ultimate goal of the supply chain is to provide support to these end users. The 
ability to tie materials expended to particular end users can provide valuable data to the 
tracking and distribution system. This data can be used to calculate current or estimate 
future requirements such as food, transportation, lodging and medical supplies. However, 
due to the challenges associated with providing aid to distressed refugees, collecting 
customer data can be challenging. These challenges could be overcome through the use of 
personal RFID cards, bracelets, or other wearable devices (Gao, 2004).     
Overall, the key to effective utilization of any technology during crisis response is 
the ability to trace the benefits of the technology directly to the customers. Even if the 
technology provides reliable total asset visibility throughout the integrated supply chain, if 
it does not improve the lot of the customer, it is basically unjustifiable. Having access to 
the information is the easy part. Being able to effectively interpret that information and 
achieve a useful common operational picture will require skill and training. By 
maximizing the efficiency with which resources are allocated and distributed, planners 







Maintaining a state of readiness for unexpected events is a complicated 
undertaking that requires more than simply publishing a set of policies and procedures. 
Instead, it will take a sustained, long-term commitment from capable leaders and trained 
personnel to do what is necessary for the successful implementation of a viable logistics 
framework. In addition to the three critical success factors introduced in Figure 1, 
modularity, integrated systems, and asset visibility technology, we will address 
considerations for training and procurement.  
Achieving modularity with respect to structure, resource configuration and systems 
will require that the right people be appointed to key positions, people that understand 
coordinated logistics and the complexities that accompany it. The U.S. Federal 
government has acknowledged the need to fully integrate the DoD into the National 
Response Plan (NRP). They emphasize integration at every level of government (The 
White House, 2006). This acknowledgement could turn out to be the most critical element 
toward a successful strategic shift in the way crisis management activities are conducted. 
Properly incorporated into the NRP, certain U.S. DoD logistics systems and practices 
currently in use would offer numerous benefits (Learning curve, turn-key operational 
abilities, and cost). The salaries of DoD personnel are in essence a fixed cost. Units 
already exist whose missions can be modified to include crisis response as a core 
competency. Assigning a primary role to the DoD exploits a highly-trained, in-place 
personnel structure.     
The overall manner in which the U.S. military trains and organizes its operations 
serves as one of the best models for use during crisis management activities. This is 
mainly due to the culture of discipline that exists within the military and the experience it 
has in conducting operations during chaos and war. National Guard and component 
reserve units are best suited to train for rapid response within each of the Department of 
Homeland Security’s 10 designated crisis response regions. They are well-suited to run 
Operational Logistics Centers, and their military bearing and presence will increase the 
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likelihood of order during a crisis. They possess the necessary discipline, basic skills, 
esprit de corps, and training opportunities. Any attempt to create this core capability from 
scratch would face myriad challenges that have already been met by the National Guard.    
In order to implement an effective training program, designated agencies and 
military units will need to become intimate with procedures and systems. Federal and 
State governments need to consider long-term budget implications in at least two main 
areas: (1) The procurement of commercial off the shelf (COTS) items and (2) The 
quarterly training of designated national guardsmen, reservists, and emergency operation 
center (EOC) personnel. Table 3 provides some general estimates of critical items and 
resources as well as training requirements based on populations within the 10 Federal 
Emergency Management Regions. Assumptions used in calculating the estimates follow; 
population estimates are taken from the U.S. Census Bureau (2005).  
 
Table 3.   Procurement Considerations  
 
Transponder Assumptions for Table 3  
1) Estimates are based on the assumption that no more than 25% of a particular Region is affected. 
2) One Module consists of 5 containers loaded with enough life-sustaining resources for 5,000 people 
per day. 
3) When more than 25% of a particular region is affected, containers will be involved in multiple trips 
per day to Logistics Operations Centers either within their Region or within neighboring Regions. 
RFID Reader Assumptions for Table 3 
1) The above estimates are based on the assumption that no more than 10% of a particular region is 
affected. 
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2) One Logistics Operations Center can service up to 20,000 people/day. 
3) In the case where more than 10% of a particular region is affected, assume that Logistics 
Operations Center assets will be pulled from neighboring Regions. 
4) Assume 10 hand-held Interrogators per Logistics Operations Center. 
5) Assume 6 Static Interrogators per Logistics Operations Center. 
Training Assumptions for Table 3  
1) Assume 24 National Guardsmen, Reservists, and other State EOC Personnel are needed to operate 
one Logistics Operations Center. 
2) The above estimates are based on the assumption that no more than 10% of a particular region is 
affected. 
3) One Logistics Operations Center can service up to 20,000 people/day. 
4) In the case where more than 10% of a particular region is affected, assume that Logistics 
Operations Center assets, to include personnel, will be pulled from neighboring Regions. 
 
Commercial off-the-shelf products exist that can be utilized to create a framework 
that integrates all necessary elements of an effective crisis response logistics system for 
use by the DoD, DHS, the private sector, and the international community. The U.S. 
Military and private sector companies are currently employing effective comprehensive 
asset-tracking technologies. As we discussed in the previous section, the U.S. Army has 
had great success with MTS. Wal-MartTM is an industry pioneer and leader with respect to 
supply chain management. Adopting these and other industry best practices into an 
integrated, comprehensive and standardized framework offers proven benefits. In addition 
to maximizing efficiency with respect to resource allocation and distribution, more 
information will be available to decision makers. But, unless leaders dedicate adequate 
attention and effort to sustained training and funding, even the best plan will be impaired.  
The next major crisis is coming. It could be a storm, a pandemic, an earthquake, a 
tsunami or an attack involving weapons of mass destruction. With any of these real 
possibilities, a swift and effective logistics response can be greatly enhanced by achieving 
higher levels of asset visibility. To improve asset visibility and promote a common 
operational picture, organizational command & control structures and physical resource 
flows must be tied together through timely and accurate information stored and shared via 
an integrated communications network. The logistics component of the crisis response 
framework must be flexible and modular enough to be task organized to meet the 
challenges associated with incidents of varying scope and complexity. Several 
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technologies presented here have greatly enhanced the ability to gain a common 
operational picture. As these technologies mature and new technologies become available, 
the primary question should always be how it will affect customers. In this case, the 
customers are the victims whose lives and property will be at stake. Creation of a common 
operational picture using a modular, flexible, and integrated logistics system can 
dramatically increase the likelihood of a successful response effort. The time for action is 
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